After being in this class for two weeks, there are a lot of questions that I have. One of them has to do with Piaget’s theory of the Stage Model. It makes sense that there are different stages of development. (Obviously there is more than one theory, but I will be focusing on the theory posed by Piaget.) This theory can help explain why children can only perform certain actions at certain times in their development. This is the point in which I have questions and comments. First of all, since researchers are dealing with real children in “real” situations it is pretty impossible to talk to a child within the first year of life. However, most of the studies that try and prove Piaget’s theory use infants looking behavior. Someone in class already brought up the idea that maybe babies just look around. The results of this study may have only been proving that babies look around randomly, rather than they look because they are interested. This was an idea that I had thought of as well. I know that these studies have been replicated so that probably is not the case, but it still intrigues me. Are there any other kinds of studies that try and prove Piaget’s theory differently? And if the answer is yes, then what techniques do they use instead of looking behavior? And what if child's looking behavior speaks to something else? It seems logical that young babies will look at something that is new and different. It also seems logical that young babies will look at something longer when it is puzzling or seems impossible. But what about the familiarity aspect of the situation? In prior psychology classes I have learned that there is an idea that people like things that are familiar. For instance: When participants are shown words or faces prior to a “test” (even at fast speeds) they are more likely to choose items that they have seen previously just because they were familiar. So what if this is what babies are doing? Even though this does not seem as logical, it is definitely another hypothesis. Also, if these children are doing experiments, they are probably doing the same task for many different trials. They could be getting more familiar with the experiment, and therefore have a better idea on how to respond.
I would also like to mention a thought about some of the studies that were presented in class. I would like to talk the A not B error. There have been some hypotheses about why young children are susceptible to this error. For example, children could perform the action when the time between hiding and finding was reduced. Also, when the time was extended the children were found to be responding randomly. But why is it that during this “critical time period” we find an A not B error? I am curious to know if this study was replicated across cultures. I wonder if this A not B error has to do with culture. Or I wonder if this has to do with attention span too. I guess I just have a hard time with this error. It just seems bizarre that this occurs, but only when the certain conditions are just right.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Piaget misunderstood?
I think Piaget is sometimes criticized too harshly. While it is important to critique his theory, and to fine-tune it, it is also important to realize that he was also right on a lot of accounts. I also think that some of his concepts might have been misinterpreted, which has led people to underestimate him and think that he, in turn, has underestimated what children are capable of.
One of the main pieces of criticism directed at him is that his theory implies cognitive development is qualitative and domain-general. This is, however, a label put on his theory by others, and might not be exactly what he meant. For example, he might not have meant that children miraculously master the concept of conservation on all tasks all at once when they reach the age of six or seven. It was merely his way of providing a benchmark between the preoperational and concrete operational stages – a child is considered concrete operational when they have fully mastered the concept of conservation, which is not the same as saying that children get the concept of conservation when they are concrete operational.
While this categorization can be detrimental, it provides us a general framework in which to work and has many real-life applications. For one, we can tie it in with Vygotsky’s concept of the zone of proximal development and scaffolding, and therefore provide children with the encouragement they need to master the tasks we know are within reach at each stage, or age. We know, thanks to Piaget, that it is probably more appropriate to help a two-year-old master the concept of object permanence than to introduce the idea of class inclusion, which would most probably be beyond the child’s experience and mental capacity to handle.
It has to be acknowledged that children develop at different rates, and that there can never be one mould that we can squeeze everyone into. There has been proof that children can master the concepts from a different stage with some help, proving that they are capable. Piaget’s theories therefore do not apply to every single child, but then again no one else’s has or ever will. We must acknowledge, however, the generalizability of Piaget’s theories. It is simple amazing how many times the experiments and results for conservation, A-not-B error, and object permanence, to name a few, have been replicated. This replication can not only be found across variations of the original experiments, but also across cultures and generations. This shows that his “qualitative and domain-general” theories have some truth to it in terms of what children of a specific age group are capable of, if no one specifically trains them on a particular task.
Another major criticism of his theory is that competence is not only demonstrated through performance. One of the main theories discussed in class in illustration of this argument was the A-not-B error. Children are said to have “overcome” this error because they look at the blanket the toy is under, even while reaching for the other blanket under which they initially found the toy the first time. They know, the argument goes, where the toy is, they are simply reaching for the wrong blanket out of habit. As far as I’m concerned, inhibiting this impulse to reach for the wrong blanket and going for the one they know is right is very much part of cognitive development. Until they have inhibited this urge, they have not overcome the A-not-B error, and Piaget is right. Again, it is true that children can be trained, and will get better at it the more they perform the task, but this, as mentioned earlier, is “unnatural”, because under normal circumstances they would not get this much practice in so short a period. At any rate, this observation that children get better at doing something the more they do it is in strong support of Piaget’s overarching concept of the child as a little scientist, learning from trial and error.
In summary, Piaget should be accorded no small amount of respect for his astute observations and theories that he formulated pretty much single-handedly. He could not explain everything, and so his theories are by no means the final word in cognitive development. But rather than being pushed aside and replaced by more contemporary theories, they should be recognized as a firm foundation on which the field of cognitive development can flourish.
One of the main pieces of criticism directed at him is that his theory implies cognitive development is qualitative and domain-general. This is, however, a label put on his theory by others, and might not be exactly what he meant. For example, he might not have meant that children miraculously master the concept of conservation on all tasks all at once when they reach the age of six or seven. It was merely his way of providing a benchmark between the preoperational and concrete operational stages – a child is considered concrete operational when they have fully mastered the concept of conservation, which is not the same as saying that children get the concept of conservation when they are concrete operational.
While this categorization can be detrimental, it provides us a general framework in which to work and has many real-life applications. For one, we can tie it in with Vygotsky’s concept of the zone of proximal development and scaffolding, and therefore provide children with the encouragement they need to master the tasks we know are within reach at each stage, or age. We know, thanks to Piaget, that it is probably more appropriate to help a two-year-old master the concept of object permanence than to introduce the idea of class inclusion, which would most probably be beyond the child’s experience and mental capacity to handle.
It has to be acknowledged that children develop at different rates, and that there can never be one mould that we can squeeze everyone into. There has been proof that children can master the concepts from a different stage with some help, proving that they are capable. Piaget’s theories therefore do not apply to every single child, but then again no one else’s has or ever will. We must acknowledge, however, the generalizability of Piaget’s theories. It is simple amazing how many times the experiments and results for conservation, A-not-B error, and object permanence, to name a few, have been replicated. This replication can not only be found across variations of the original experiments, but also across cultures and generations. This shows that his “qualitative and domain-general” theories have some truth to it in terms of what children of a specific age group are capable of, if no one specifically trains them on a particular task.
Another major criticism of his theory is that competence is not only demonstrated through performance. One of the main theories discussed in class in illustration of this argument was the A-not-B error. Children are said to have “overcome” this error because they look at the blanket the toy is under, even while reaching for the other blanket under which they initially found the toy the first time. They know, the argument goes, where the toy is, they are simply reaching for the wrong blanket out of habit. As far as I’m concerned, inhibiting this impulse to reach for the wrong blanket and going for the one they know is right is very much part of cognitive development. Until they have inhibited this urge, they have not overcome the A-not-B error, and Piaget is right. Again, it is true that children can be trained, and will get better at it the more they perform the task, but this, as mentioned earlier, is “unnatural”, because under normal circumstances they would not get this much practice in so short a period. At any rate, this observation that children get better at doing something the more they do it is in strong support of Piaget’s overarching concept of the child as a little scientist, learning from trial and error.
In summary, Piaget should be accorded no small amount of respect for his astute observations and theories that he formulated pretty much single-handedly. He could not explain everything, and so his theories are by no means the final word in cognitive development. But rather than being pushed aside and replaced by more contemporary theories, they should be recognized as a firm foundation on which the field of cognitive development can flourish.
12 oz. Can or 12 oz. bottle
Last year my roommate and I were going to Safeway to get some beer for the weekend. We got to the beer aisle and being the frugal college students that we are we spent some time scanning the variety of brewers and prices we had to choose from. Eventually we settled on Coors, I reached for the 24-pack of cans for 20 bucks, and he reached for the 18-pack of bottles for 19 bucks. When I asked him what he was doing he replied, “Well I know that case has more cans, but there’s more beer in these bottles.” The point I’m trying to highlight is that I feel there is an over estimation of our own abilities. Why do you think really expensive Vodkas come in really tall, thin containers? What the conservation tasks demonstrate is simply that the children who fail at this do not have a conceptual understanding or schema to deal with what is being asked of them. When they hear more, they may simply think taller. From the Human Performance class, we know that we are most accurate at making a decision about the respective lengths of two lines that start at the same datum. Next is comparing two lines that are not lined up on one end. It turns out that making comparisons between both volumes and areas is something that most of us are terrible at. It’s something that we develop over years of observation, so it seems silly to me to be surprised when a child makes this mistake. The visual cliff is the most compelling evidence to me that children learn through their observations. Let’s think about what a baby sees for the first time. They lie on their backs and observe things floating in and out of there visual field. As adults we have a clear concept of up and down, because we spend the majority of waking life in one orientation. Things fall from top to bottom in our visual field. But a baby observes a mobile that is suspended in its field, nothing above or below it. Adult’s faces come at them from all angles, attached to bodies that extend out of their few, and when they turn to watch them walk away they see something contacting the ground (which is there visual side). Occlusion and continuity are simply the first things that they have any chance of understanding. When a baby begins to sit itself up, and learn that is how it needs to be oriented t move, it then can begin to understand concepts like support and physical laws like gravity. If I was carried everywhere on my side, held upside down, and tossed in the air, I’d be pretty confused as to which way things where supposed to happen too. The assumption may be made that we have a kinesthetic sense that tells us which way is up, and we do, but it’s very easy to confuse. When pilots come into bad whether and they no longer have readily available cues to orient them to what their pitch is, if they don’t know how to fly by there gauges they will enter a state of vertigo and fly there planes straight into the ground. I don’t think that the assumption should be made that babies have innate understandings, or a naïve sense of physics. Just because they demonstrate an ability to be more interested in the things that they have the ability to perceive doesn’t mean that they where born with those abilities. It’s kind of a stretch but I think our dreams are a good example of this. When I was young I remember flying and doing amazing things in my dreams all the times. There were huge monsters to run away from. I even had a dream with the Young Looney Tunes, cartoon colors and all. Well now I know I can’t fly, so I don’t fly any more. I’ve never had the experience of actually being chased by a monster so that doesn’t happen anymore either. About the worst thing that happens in my dreams now is a horrible breakup or waking up in a dream and realizing I hadn’t written a term paper. Still pretty scary, but they all hold to the physics I’ve come to understand after 21 years.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Critical Times
As others have noted, one of the main issues disagreed upon in the field is whether infants are born with some innate knowledge, or merely the hardwiring to develop knowledge based on experience. All agree that babies learn very rapidly within their first year. Though Piaget, the "father of cognitive development," thought that infants have no real physical knowledge before 4 months of age, research has since supported the theory that infants as young as 2.5 months have expectations about how objects should interact in the physical world.
In Spelke's theory of innate knowledge, she suggests that infants are born with knowledge of 3 core principles of "naive physics": cohesion, continuity, and contact. As they experience the world, infants then expand on these basics with additional knowledge. In the continuity experiment (Kellman & Kestenbaum, 1986) which we looked at in class, infants as young as 2-3 months were shown to be surprised by violations of the continuity principle (the ball disappearing behind one occluder and reappearing behind a separate occluder). Several studies (many by Baillargeon) on infants 2-3 months old have also measured their expectations of the principles of occlusion, containment, and covering, and have found that infants of this age do indeed have expectations about these events. Does this give support to the theory of innate knowledge, or do these other measured competencies at such a young age suggest that all knowledge is learned? What is it about this age of about 2.5 months that allows infants to suddenly exhibit their competence in these principles? If they had competency prior to this age, could it be accurately tested?
In 1990, Slater et. al. used a study design previously used by Kellman and Spelke (1983) to test whether infants perceive a center-occluded object, which moves as a whole, as one object or two (infants at around 4 months had shown surprise when the occluder was removed to reveal two objects relative to one object). Using this design, Slater and colleagues altered the display in such a way that a newborn, with their limited visual abilities, would be able to perceive it. They then tested two different age groups, newborns and 2 months olds with the display. The results showed that newborns looked longer at the single object (in contrast with the 4 month olds), and the two month olds showed no preference. This suggests that these younger infants do not have the same conception of object unity, and therefore this knowledge must be learned. But could there be other explanations for the younger infants' performance on this task? I suggest that there is, and that it involves not their knowledge of the physical world, but simply their perceptual abilities and the systems by which they process that information.
Two very important things are changing in visual perception abilities for infants younger than 2.5 months, and I don't mean quantitative improvements in vision. First of all, we've learned that eye tracking changes in nature as infants progress through this stage. They begin by tracking only one edge of one object at a time, progressing to several edges and between objects. Secondly, infants are transitioning between their reliance on subcortical pathways and cortical pathways for visual information between birth and two months. So, looking at the "failure" of young infants on the object unity task, we could suggest that young infants may not be able to perceive and examine more than one object at a time at that stage, since their tracking is limited. Additionally, brought in on the "quick and dirty" subcortical pathways could be processed in some qualitatively different way than information that is later brought in through cortical pathways (after about 2 months).
Whatever the explanation, innate knowledge or learned, 2.5 months of age seems to be an important stage after which we know a great deal about cognitive development, and before which we know little. What other methods of experimentation might psychologists tap into in order to study this enigmatic time?
In Spelke's theory of innate knowledge, she suggests that infants are born with knowledge of 3 core principles of "naive physics": cohesion, continuity, and contact. As they experience the world, infants then expand on these basics with additional knowledge. In the continuity experiment (Kellman & Kestenbaum, 1986) which we looked at in class, infants as young as 2-3 months were shown to be surprised by violations of the continuity principle (the ball disappearing behind one occluder and reappearing behind a separate occluder). Several studies (many by Baillargeon) on infants 2-3 months old have also measured their expectations of the principles of occlusion, containment, and covering, and have found that infants of this age do indeed have expectations about these events. Does this give support to the theory of innate knowledge, or do these other measured competencies at such a young age suggest that all knowledge is learned? What is it about this age of about 2.5 months that allows infants to suddenly exhibit their competence in these principles? If they had competency prior to this age, could it be accurately tested?
In 1990, Slater et. al. used a study design previously used by Kellman and Spelke (1983) to test whether infants perceive a center-occluded object, which moves as a whole, as one object or two (infants at around 4 months had shown surprise when the occluder was removed to reveal two objects relative to one object). Using this design, Slater and colleagues altered the display in such a way that a newborn, with their limited visual abilities, would be able to perceive it. They then tested two different age groups, newborns and 2 months olds with the display. The results showed that newborns looked longer at the single object (in contrast with the 4 month olds), and the two month olds showed no preference. This suggests that these younger infants do not have the same conception of object unity, and therefore this knowledge must be learned. But could there be other explanations for the younger infants' performance on this task? I suggest that there is, and that it involves not their knowledge of the physical world, but simply their perceptual abilities and the systems by which they process that information.
Two very important things are changing in visual perception abilities for infants younger than 2.5 months, and I don't mean quantitative improvements in vision. First of all, we've learned that eye tracking changes in nature as infants progress through this stage. They begin by tracking only one edge of one object at a time, progressing to several edges and between objects. Secondly, infants are transitioning between their reliance on subcortical pathways and cortical pathways for visual information between birth and two months. So, looking at the "failure" of young infants on the object unity task, we could suggest that young infants may not be able to perceive and examine more than one object at a time at that stage, since their tracking is limited. Additionally, brought in on the "quick and dirty" subcortical pathways could be processed in some qualitatively different way than information that is later brought in through cortical pathways (after about 2 months).
Whatever the explanation, innate knowledge or learned, 2.5 months of age seems to be an important stage after which we know a great deal about cognitive development, and before which we know little. What other methods of experimentation might psychologists tap into in order to study this enigmatic time?
Skepticism
In learning about infant’s perception of their physical world we have been presented with many interesting theories and ways of testing and measuring an infant’s development and their understanding of the objects in their world. While many of these ways of measuring infant’s development of their perception of the physical world seem logical, I couldn’t help but be skeptical about some of them.
One thing that stirred up some skepticism in me was Elizabeth Spelke’s paper on the Origins of Physical Knowledge, in particular her section related to language and conceptual development. Throughout the class thus far, we have discussed the development of physical knowledge based on infant’s looking behavior, which makes complete sense when taking into account the fact that infants are not capable of speech. However, I couldn’t help but think about how much speech actually contributes to the development of physical knowledge. Spelke makes the argument that language does not play an important role in the development of physical knowledge because the act of merely observing an object does not require one to “articulate the principles of one’s theory or communicate with others about it.” This seems completely reasonable, but it seems to me that the development of physical knowledge also relies on language because it seems impossible that an infant would be able to develop a complete understanding of its physical world before it could verbally inquire about it.
Something else presented in class and in the readings that has made me think twice has to do with the concept of the A not B error. When watching the videos in which an infant is presented with an interesting object that is covered by one of two clothes, one cannot help but notice that the infant is given verbal encouragement to find the object, verbally rewarded when the infant pulls off the right cloth, and then reinforced when the infant is able to grab and play with the object. My question is, how much does the reward and the positive reinforcement influence the infant in choosing which cover to pull off? In other words, is it possible that the infant continues to go to the incorrect cloth even though he/she knows that the object is not there due to the verbal encouragement that he/she received? Has this ever been controlled for in the A not B study? The idea is especially intriguing to me because it has been said that babies will look at the correct cloth hiding the object while they are pulling off the cloth that was previously hiding the object. Are they continuing to make the same mistake repeatedly because they think they are pleasing their parent or the adult involved in the experiment?
In lecture we discussed the development of concrete operations and the diagnostic tasks used to assess this development such as the conservation, seriation, and class inclusion tasks. In watching the videos which showed these tasks in action, I could not help but think that it was quite possible that some of the children produced incorrect responses not because they were cognitively unable to do so, but because the could not understand why the adults were asking them the silly questions. Also, I think that they may have made the errors that they did because they were assuming that the adults asking the questions knew better than to ask such questions.
Thus far, the readings and lecture in this class have provided me with a better understanding of how children gain an understanding of their physical world. I think it would prove useful to look into how researchers such as Spelke and Baillargeon control for some of the problems that arise in their studies in order to gain an even better grasp of cognitive development.
One thing that stirred up some skepticism in me was Elizabeth Spelke’s paper on the Origins of Physical Knowledge, in particular her section related to language and conceptual development. Throughout the class thus far, we have discussed the development of physical knowledge based on infant’s looking behavior, which makes complete sense when taking into account the fact that infants are not capable of speech. However, I couldn’t help but think about how much speech actually contributes to the development of physical knowledge. Spelke makes the argument that language does not play an important role in the development of physical knowledge because the act of merely observing an object does not require one to “articulate the principles of one’s theory or communicate with others about it.” This seems completely reasonable, but it seems to me that the development of physical knowledge also relies on language because it seems impossible that an infant would be able to develop a complete understanding of its physical world before it could verbally inquire about it.
Something else presented in class and in the readings that has made me think twice has to do with the concept of the A not B error. When watching the videos in which an infant is presented with an interesting object that is covered by one of two clothes, one cannot help but notice that the infant is given verbal encouragement to find the object, verbally rewarded when the infant pulls off the right cloth, and then reinforced when the infant is able to grab and play with the object. My question is, how much does the reward and the positive reinforcement influence the infant in choosing which cover to pull off? In other words, is it possible that the infant continues to go to the incorrect cloth even though he/she knows that the object is not there due to the verbal encouragement that he/she received? Has this ever been controlled for in the A not B study? The idea is especially intriguing to me because it has been said that babies will look at the correct cloth hiding the object while they are pulling off the cloth that was previously hiding the object. Are they continuing to make the same mistake repeatedly because they think they are pleasing their parent or the adult involved in the experiment?
In lecture we discussed the development of concrete operations and the diagnostic tasks used to assess this development such as the conservation, seriation, and class inclusion tasks. In watching the videos which showed these tasks in action, I could not help but think that it was quite possible that some of the children produced incorrect responses not because they were cognitively unable to do so, but because the could not understand why the adults were asking them the silly questions. Also, I think that they may have made the errors that they did because they were assuming that the adults asking the questions knew better than to ask such questions.
Thus far, the readings and lecture in this class have provided me with a better understanding of how children gain an understanding of their physical world. I think it would prove useful to look into how researchers such as Spelke and Baillargeon control for some of the problems that arise in their studies in order to gain an even better grasp of cognitive development.
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Innate Abilities
When a child is born does he/she come into the world as a “blank slate” (tabula rasa) that must develop abilities and other characteristics from scratch or are they born already possessing a “base” set of abilities from which to build? While it is generally assumed that infants do indeed begin life with an innate set of abilities theorists are not in agreement as to how extensive those abilities are and just what these abilities entail.
The term innate means “in-born” or having “at-birth” characteristics and can be metaphorically symbolized, using the computer metaphor as being like ROM (read only memory) of a computer and then also the plasticity of a young brain metaphorically seen as RAM (random access memory). Also, from a Freudian/evolutionary point of view, the early stages that are innate are related to the basal “id’ and what creatures lived eons ago that are relative to the statement “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”; wherein the developmental stages of the brain’s development are similar to the evolutionary processes of previous life-forms over the history of Earth. The Freudian “id” that is manifest in the early functions of life goes along with the development of the “ego” next, and then the “super-ego” finally. Id, ego and super-ego can be simplistically thought of as want, can and should. I see the “id” as innate.
I see the ego as being developed by specific personal experiences early in life and finally the super-ego being achieved through something like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs ultimately being a search for religion and God. Freud said “…a search for utopia.” I say a hope for Heaven only for the “good’ beings that deserve it. If children are taught at a young age about religion and that if they are “good” they will have everlasting life in heaven, I believe they will develop into a functional society that is compassionate, loving, and not dysfunctional. I emphasize here the importance of religion on the developing brain. Statistics, used in the psychological field, prove the importance of this point of view. To secure this even more, a developing mind that is taught “evil” and “wickedness” leads to Hell, except through the salvation of Jesus, which is a metaphor for an “eternal lake of fire.’
I believe it is innate, no matter what race, color or language, that children will accept this stimulus of empirical religion and that this empirical religion will have a greatly beneficial effect on their cognition and behavior from a “wee” little age to an old person. Is it not everyone’s desire to exist in Heaven (fun, good times, no pain, holiness, enjoyment) forever. If only God could save the world.
The term innate means “in-born” or having “at-birth” characteristics and can be metaphorically symbolized, using the computer metaphor as being like ROM (read only memory) of a computer and then also the plasticity of a young brain metaphorically seen as RAM (random access memory). Also, from a Freudian/evolutionary point of view, the early stages that are innate are related to the basal “id’ and what creatures lived eons ago that are relative to the statement “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”; wherein the developmental stages of the brain’s development are similar to the evolutionary processes of previous life-forms over the history of Earth. The Freudian “id” that is manifest in the early functions of life goes along with the development of the “ego” next, and then the “super-ego” finally. Id, ego and super-ego can be simplistically thought of as want, can and should. I see the “id” as innate.
I see the ego as being developed by specific personal experiences early in life and finally the super-ego being achieved through something like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs ultimately being a search for religion and God. Freud said “…a search for utopia.” I say a hope for Heaven only for the “good’ beings that deserve it. If children are taught at a young age about religion and that if they are “good” they will have everlasting life in heaven, I believe they will develop into a functional society that is compassionate, loving, and not dysfunctional. I emphasize here the importance of religion on the developing brain. Statistics, used in the psychological field, prove the importance of this point of view. To secure this even more, a developing mind that is taught “evil” and “wickedness” leads to Hell, except through the salvation of Jesus, which is a metaphor for an “eternal lake of fire.’
I believe it is innate, no matter what race, color or language, that children will accept this stimulus of empirical religion and that this empirical religion will have a greatly beneficial effect on their cognition and behavior from a “wee” little age to an old person. Is it not everyone’s desire to exist in Heaven (fun, good times, no pain, holiness, enjoyment) forever. If only God could save the world.
Monday, October 8, 2007
My thoughts on Cognitive Development
Initially I believed that most aspects of functioning and understanding life were learned more than innate. The material we have looked at so far has made me reanalyze my thoughts of cognitive development. The class hasn’t made me change my initial thought completely but it has allowed me to evolve from it. Not only is learning very important to cognitive development but so are the innate abilities that help us process our learning. What this class has taught me (at least the way I interpret it) is that our brains supply us with essential tools, and our environment helps us utilize those tools that enable our process of thought and perception to evolve. The evolution of our thoughts leads to the ability for complex problem solving and reasoning. Since we have some innate abilities that help us learn, the more we exercise them the easier it becomes to process.
An example of this would be the study by Pescalis, 2005, (discussed in class) where infants were exposed to faces of different monkeys over a long period of time allowing them to become experts in distinguishing monkey faces. Another example on the other end of the spectrum is the story of the feral child Genie. Genie was subjected to severe confinement with no social interaction and spent nearly all her life tied to toilet in the basement of her families home. She wasn’t discovered until the age of thirteen. Genie lost most of her ability to speak or even physically function. Many say this is due to the fact that she was never exposed to very important social aspects of life as she developed into a teenager. Both these examples show the importance of taking advantage of what our innate cognitive processes have to offer us and exercising those abilities through learning and early exposure.
A personal example of my own cognitive development that I could vividly recall was when I was around the age of six and constantly arguing with my parents that plants were not alive like people were. I couldn’t grasp the idea that plants could be alive simply because I associated being alive as having feelings and talking or at least having a heart- beat. This is evidence that I went through Paiget’s stages of assimilation, accommodation, and equilibration, when I finally realized that not all living things share the same characteristics. So far this class has exposed me to many different views of cognitive development, the two main classifications being innate or learned. The more I consider both sides the more I believe that it is a combination of both. Piaget’s experiments and outcomes can be interpreted many different ways but so can Spelkes ideas. The difficulty with studying cognitive development is that the subjects (babies and children) cannot accurately tell you what they are feeling or what they are thinking. This situation leaves most of the results of cognitive development involving children to behavioral observation. In the end this makes for very interesting results because it allows researchers to learn different aspects of cognitive development because there is an advantage of being able to see it from many different viewpoints.
An example of this would be the study by Pescalis, 2005, (discussed in class) where infants were exposed to faces of different monkeys over a long period of time allowing them to become experts in distinguishing monkey faces. Another example on the other end of the spectrum is the story of the feral child Genie. Genie was subjected to severe confinement with no social interaction and spent nearly all her life tied to toilet in the basement of her families home. She wasn’t discovered until the age of thirteen. Genie lost most of her ability to speak or even physically function. Many say this is due to the fact that she was never exposed to very important social aspects of life as she developed into a teenager. Both these examples show the importance of taking advantage of what our innate cognitive processes have to offer us and exercising those abilities through learning and early exposure.
A personal example of my own cognitive development that I could vividly recall was when I was around the age of six and constantly arguing with my parents that plants were not alive like people were. I couldn’t grasp the idea that plants could be alive simply because I associated being alive as having feelings and talking or at least having a heart- beat. This is evidence that I went through Paiget’s stages of assimilation, accommodation, and equilibration, when I finally realized that not all living things share the same characteristics. So far this class has exposed me to many different views of cognitive development, the two main classifications being innate or learned. The more I consider both sides the more I believe that it is a combination of both. Piaget’s experiments and outcomes can be interpreted many different ways but so can Spelkes ideas. The difficulty with studying cognitive development is that the subjects (babies and children) cannot accurately tell you what they are feeling or what they are thinking. This situation leaves most of the results of cognitive development involving children to behavioral observation. In the end this makes for very interesting results because it allows researchers to learn different aspects of cognitive development because there is an advantage of being able to see it from many different viewpoints.
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